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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Federal Circuit issued over two hundred and fifty
precedential opinions and orders. This article discusses sixteen
precedent-setting opinions involving government contract law issues,
setting forth the relevant facts, the Federal Circuit’s analysis, and key
1
points for practitioners to glean from each case. This article also
includes a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s September 2006
opinion regarding the TRICARE Pharmacy Benefits Program
(“TPBP”) refund program, a case that the pharmaceutical industry
watched closely. The decisions have been grouped into the following
categories:
jurisdiction, contract interpretation, costs, contract
termination, bid protests, and patent rights.
I.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction cases involve the Federal Circuit’s ability to hear
and decide disputes involving government contract issues. Board of
2
Trustees of Bay Medical Center v. Humana Military Healthcare Services
illustrates the difficulty of demonstrating that the United States is the
proper defendant to a subcontractor’s claims against a prime
3
contractor. Wesleyan Co. v. Harvey reiterates one key consideration
that contractors should make when deciding between filing at Boards
of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”).
4
Finally, PSEG Nuclear v. United States addresses whether a broad
statutory conferral of jurisdiction to the U.S. Courts of Appeals over
issues related to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act strips the COFC of
Tucker Act subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Board of Trustees of Bay Medical Center v. Humana
In Humana II, the Federal Circuit rejected a prime contractor’s
argument that the United States was the “real party in interest” to its
subcontractor’s claim and affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
5
COFC lacked jurisdiction over the subcontractor’s claims.
1. This Article excludes the Federal Circuit’s Winstar-related opinions, which are
the subject of a separate article in this issue.
2. Bd. Of Trs. Of Bay Med. Ctr. V. Humana Military Healthcase Servs. (Humana
II), 447 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
3. 454 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
4. 465 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
5. 447 F.3d at 1372.
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In January 1996, Humana entered into a contract (the “prime
contract”) with the Department of Defense (“DOD”) to provide
managed care medical services to certain beneficiaries in a
6
geographical region.
Humana then subcontracted with local
hospitals to provide the health care services required under the
prime contract. The prime contract was based on a fixed price and
permitted Humana to negotiate rates of payment and payment
methodologies with its subcontractor hospitals. Humana assumed
the risk for the cost of healthcare (i.e., the government would not pay
7
Humana for any amount above the maximum specified rate).
Humana paid the subcontractor hospitals’ rates agreed upon in the
8
negotiated subcontracts.
In October 1999, without notice, Humana reduced the amount
of payments to its subcontractor hospitals for outpatient nonsurgical
9
services by applying certain maximum rates. The rates were based
on a schedule of maximum rates issued by the DOD for outpatient
10
nonsurgical services. Although the DOD issued a policy statement
in March 2000 that approved of the application of such maximum
11
rates to subcontractor hospital providers, Humana was still free to
12
pay its subcontractors higher rates and absorb the difference.
Humana declined to pay its subcontractor hospitals the higher rate
set forth in the subcontract. The subcontractor hospitals sued
Humana in the Northern District of Florida and alleged breach of
contract based on the reduced payments. Humana sought to transfer
13
the case to the COFC under Tucker Act jurisdiction, arguing that
6. Id. This case concerned administrator-provider contracts for medical services
under the DOD Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(“CHAMPUS”), established in 1967. In 1995, the DOD established TRICARE, a
managed health care program that involved the competitive selection of contractors
to underwrite the delivery of health care services under CHAMPUS. Bd. of Trs. of
Bay Med. Ctr. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs. (Humana I), 2004 WL 3314946,
at *1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2004). The program was administered through the
TRICARE Management Activity, which was previously the Office of CHAMPUS. Id.
Under the TRICARE system, the DOD began using managed care support providers.
Here, Humana was the managed care support provider.
7. Id. at *2; see, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 199.14 (2006). Federal law prohibits the
reimbursement of outpatient professional services billed by institutional providers in
excess of the CHAMPUS/TRICARE Maximum Allowable Charge (“CMAC”). Thus,
if Humana’s negotiated rates exceeded the government’s reimbursement limits, then
Humana would have to pay for the overage out of its profit.
8. Humana II, 447 F.3d at 1372.
9. Id. This was the CMAC rate.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1373.
12. Humana I, 2004 WL 3314946, at *2.
13. The Tucker Act waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity but
limited the jurisdiction of the COFC to hear claims “against the United States
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the true nature of the subcontractor hospitals’ claims were for money
damages against the government, which stemmed from the DOD’s
approval of the application of maximum rates to the subcontractor
14
hospitals.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the subcontractor hospitals that
15
Humana, not the government, was the proper defendant. First, the
subcontractor’s complaint included both a breach of contract claim
against Humana and a declaratory judgment claim against the
government asserting that the DOD’s March 2000 policy statement
16
was invalid. The complaint clearly alleged that, independent of the
validity of the government’s policy, the breach of contract claims
against Humana remained intact: “[the DOD policy] did not change
or otherwise affect the contracts entered into between Humana and
17
[the subcontractor hospitals].” Thus, the complaint unambiguously
demonstrated that the subcontractor hospitals’ contract claims were
18
directed against Humana, not the government.
Second, the subcontract was a private agreement between Humana
and the subcontractor hospitals, the government was not a party to
those subcontracts, and the subcontractor hospitals had no direct
19
relationship with the government. Moreover, Humana’s reliance
upon DOD policy as a defense to its liability did not transform the
subcontractor hospitals’ claims into claims against the government.
Third, although Humana argued that they would be allowed to
seek reimbursement (i.e., indemnification) from the government if it
were found liable, that alone would not make the government the
20
“real party in interest.”
In so reasoning, the Federal Circuit
21
distinguished Texas Peanut Farmers v. United States and Consolidated
22
Edison Co. of New York v. United States. In Texas Peanut Farmers, the
contracts at issue had “plainly stat[ed]” that the defendant was the
reinsurer and liable for money damages, but Humana’s subcontracts
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
14. 447 F.3d at 1373.
15. Id.
16. Id. In its declaratory judgment claim against the government, the hospitals
argued that the DOD policy conflicted with regulation, and that the policy set a
substantive rule that should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
17. Id. at 1375 (quoting the subcontractor hospital’s complaint).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 409 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
22. 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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with the hospitals gave no indication that the government would act
as a reinsurer or indemnifier, and thus the government was not a
23
In Consolidated Edison, the plaintiffs were in
proper defendant.
privity of contract with the government and directly sought monetary
relief from the government, warranting transfer from district court to
24
the COFC. Therefore, neither case provided support for Humana.
To shift liability, a prime contractor will often attempt to recast its
subcontractor’s claims as claims against the government. The
Humana II case illustrates the obstacles a prime contractor faces when
arguing that the government is the “real party in interest” in a
subcontractor claim. Prime contractors that can establish privity of
contract between the subcontractor and the government are in a
much better position to demonstrate that the government is the “real
party in interest” in order to obtain a transfer to the COFC.
B. Wesleyan Co. v. Harvey
25

In Wesleyan, the Federal Circuit addressed whether the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) held subject matter
jurisdiction over Wesleyan’s $21 million claim against the Army for
allegedly disclosing proprietary data to nongovernmental third
parties.
In 1983, Wesleyan submitted to the Army an unsolicited proposal
for a mobile hydration system that allows a soldier to drink without
26
removing his protective mask.
The proposal included Defense
Acquisition Regulation (“DAR”) 3-507.1(a), which prohibited the
government from disclosing information in the proposal to third
27
parties. After determining that Wesleyan’s system was feasible, the
Army requested that Wesleyan lend a prototype to a manufacturer to
incorporate into a soldier’s protective suit. Wesleyan executed a
bailment agreement with the manufacturer that was limited to this
28
purpose. Between 1984 and 1989, the Army continued testing the
29
Wesleyan system and issued six purchase orders for the systems. In
1992, the Army completed its testing of the system and terminated

23. 447 F.3d at 1376.
24. Id.
25. Wesleyan Co. v. Harvey, 454 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
26. Id. at 1376.
27. Id. This proposal was the second proposal that Wesleyan submitted. The
first proposal was substantially identical but rejected by the Army because it lacked
provisions governing the government’s use of unsolicited information.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1377.
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consideration of Wesleyan’s proposal. By 1998, the Army had
procured a different hydration system from a competitor of
Wesleyan, which allegedly made use of Wesleyan’s proprietary
30
information.
The sole issue on appeal was whether the ASBCA had subject
31
matter jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) to
hear Wesleyan’s claim for damages. Pursuant to the CDA, the ASBCA
has subject matter jurisdiction over “any express or implied
contract . . . entered into by an executive agency for—(1) the
32
procurement of property, other than real property in being.”
Procurement is “the acquisition by purchase, lease or barter, of
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal
33
Government.” The main issue in Wesleyan was whether there was a
procurement contract on which the claim could be founded.
The Federal Circuit found three types of agreements at issue:
(1) Wesleyan’s unsolicited proposals, (2) the bailment agreement,
34
and (3) the Army’s purchase orders. Both the unsolicited proposals
and the bailment agreement may have constituted a transfer of
“property;” however, in the Federal Circuit’s view, neither involved
“acquisition” because Wesleyan did not receive anything in
35
exchange. As such, both the unsolicited proposal and the bailment
agreement appeared “donative” in nature, were not procurement
contracts, and could not be the bases for ASBCA subject matter
36
jurisdiction under the CDA.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit held the Army’s purchase orders to
be procurement contracts. The “procurement” element existed
37
because there was an exchange of property for money.
The
“contract” element existed because the purchase orders specified the
parties involved, price, payment terms, transportation instructions,
38
and delivery instructions. Although Wesleyan had not signed the
purchase orders, the delivery of the systems signaled acceptance, and
39
resulted in a procurement contract. Accordingly, the ASBCA would
only possess subject matter jurisdiction over Wesleyan’s claims that
involved breach of the purchase orders. To succeed on its claim for
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1378.
41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2000).
41 U.S.C. § 602(a).
New Era Constr. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1152, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Wesleyan, 454 F.3d at 1378.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1378-79.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
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disclosure of propriety information, “Wesleyan must prove that the
Army obtained the confidential information that it later disclosed
improperly not from the unsolicited proposals, nor from the
40
bailment,” but exclusively from the purchase orders.
Notably, the Federal Circuit took the extra step of commenting on
Wesleyan’s litigation strategy. While Wesleyan chose to pursue its
case at the ASBCA, nothing would have prevented suit in the COFC,
where the court could have considered the nondisclosure provisions
in both Wesleyan’s unsolicited proposals and the bailment
41
agreement. Unlike the CDA, the Tucker Act does not require that a
contract with the United States relate to procurement; rather, any
“express or implied contract with the United States” is sufficient for
42
jurisdiction at the COFC.
Litigants would be wise to consider
carefully whether all their legal theories may be based on
procurement contracts before filing a complaint with the ASBCA or
the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.
C. PSEG Nuclear v. United States
The Tucker Act generally vests in the COFC jurisdiction to render
judgment in a government contracts dispute; however, that
jurisdiction is supplanted when Congress vests exclusive jurisdiction
over the dispute in another court through a specific jurisdictional
43
statute.
In PSEG, the Federal Circuit examined one such
jurisdictional statute but concluded that the COFC’s subject matter
44
jurisdiction was still intact.
45
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (“the NWPA”) authorized
the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to contract with companies that
46
generate spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”). Under the scheme set forth in
the NWPA, entities with SNF (mainly utilities) would pay into a fund,
and in return for the payment, the DOE would properly dispose of
40. Id. at 1380. Judge Newman, dissenting in this case, rejected this reasoning
and found no basis in the CDA for separating the various agreements involved. Id. at
1381 (Newman, J., dissenting). In his view, the CDA would not deny the ASBCA
authority to consider the entirety of a claim, which here included nondisclosure
provisions in both the unsolicited proposals and the bailment agreement. Id.
(Newman, J., dissenting).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2000).
42. See 454 F.3d at 1380 (noting that Wesleyan severely limited the scope of relief
available by failing to file suit under the Tucker Act).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); City of Burbank v. United States, 273 F.3d 1370, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
44. PSEG Nuclear v. United States, 465 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000).
46. Spent Nuclear Fuel is a form of radioactive waste.
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47

the SNF. The DOE developed a contract (“Standard Contract”)
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and beginning in 1983,
executed the Standard Contract with several utility companies. The
Standard Contract stated that the DOE would begin collecting and
48
disposing of the company’s SNF by January 31, 1998.
When it
became clear that the DOE was not prepared to meet this date, PSEG
49
and several companies filed breach of contract claims.
The NWPA’s jurisdictional provision conferred exclusive and
original jurisdiction in the U.S. Courts of Appeals over, inter alia,
“any final decision or action of the Secretary, the President, or the
Commission under this part; [or] alleging the failure of the
Secretary, the President, or the Commission to make any decision, or
50
take any action, required under this part . . . .” The sole question on
appeal was whether the COFC had subject matter jurisdiction over
PSEG’s breach of contract claims, or whether the NWPA stripped the
court of its Tucker Act jurisdiction in favor of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.
The Federal Circuit held that the COFC retained
51
jurisdiction.
In the Federal Circuit’s view, the key question was not whether the
breached contract provision (to begin collecting and disposing of the
company’s SNF by January 31, 1998) was statutorily mandated by the
NWPA, but whether PSEG’s claims involved the DOE’s authority
52
under the NWPA. The breached contract provision was statutorily
mandated by the NWPA to appear in the Standard Contract with
53
PSEG, and therefore, the Courts of Appeals would have exclusive
and original jurisdiction over “whether the DOE properly
54
incorporated these obligations within its contracts . . . .” However,
the NWPA did not include any provision related to the DOE’s
performance of these contractual obligations, or the damages, if any,
55
for failure to meet these obligations. PSEG’s claims related only to
47. 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (2000).
48. PSEG, 465 F.3d at 1344.
49. Id. at 1345. Several other power companies initially filed their breach of
contract claims against the DOE in the U.S. Court of Appeals. See, e.g., N. States
Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 97-1064, 1998 WL 276581, at *2 (D.C. Cir.
May 5, 1998). When the D.C. Circuit rejected subject matter jurisdiction, the
companies, including PSEG, filed their complaints in the COFC. PSEG, 465 F.3d at
1346. Judges at the COFC issued several conflicting opinions on the issue of
jurisdiction. Id. at 1347-48. This case is on appeal from one such denial of
jurisdiction.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 10139 (2000).
51. PSEG, 465 F.3d 1343.
52. Id. at 1350.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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whether the DOE breached its contractual obligations, and whether
56
These were not
PSEG was entitled to corresponding damages.
within the DOE’s statutory authority under the NWPA, and, therefore
the NWPA’s jurisdictional provision did not remove jurisdiction from
57
the COFC.
The Federal Circuit also addressed its holding in City of Burbank v.
58
United States.
There, a jurisdictional statute conferred similar
exclusive jurisdiction on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the Federal
Circuit held that “where disputed contract provisions are statutorily
mandated or are arrived at via an administrative hearing under the
[Administrative Procedures Act] in which the pertinent facts are
reflected in an administrative record, the [Court of Appeals]
possesses exclusive jurisdiction” under the statute’s jurisdiction
59
provision. In PSEG, the contract provisions at issue were statutorily
mandated and the terms of the Standard Contract were developed
60
through administrative rulemaking.
However, DOE was not
statutorily required to use the administrative rulemaking process to
61
develop the Standard Contract, and DOE could not confer
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals by its choice of administrative
62
rulemaking. Moreover, in the Federal Circuit’s view, the damages
analysis in this case would require extensive factual inquiries outside
the administrative record that the COFC was better equipped to
63
adjudicate. Thus, the COFC retained jurisdiction.
II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
In 2006, the Federal Circuit cases reiterated long-standing
principles of contract interpretation. Applied Companies v. Harvey64
illustrates the importance of carefully drafting a value engineering
change proposal. In Lear Siegler Services, Inc. v. Rumsfeld,65 the court
addresses the addressed events that trigger the Price Adjustment
Clause. Moreover, in Medlin Construction Group v. Harvey,66 the court
reconciled seemingly conflicting contract provisions.
In TEG56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 273 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
59. Id. at 1380.
60. 465 F.3d at 1350.
61. Id. DOE did so because it preferred developing a contract with standard
provisions that could be used with multiple plant operators to the extent practicable.
48 Fed. Reg. 5458, 5459 (Feb. 4, 1983).
62. 465 F.3d at 1350.
63. Id. at 1350-51.
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Paradigm Environmental Inc. v. United States,67 the court held that the
contractor was required to decontaminate a building such that no
asbestos remained in the pores and cracks. Lastly, the court held that
a contractor is not entitled to retroactive repricing of work already
performed where the task order modification did not expressly
provide for retroactive repricing.68
A. Applied Companies v. Harvey
69

In Applied Companies v. Harvey the issue was whether a value
engineering change proposal (“VECP”) provided a reward for savings
that might accrue by applying the concept to other companies’
products, as well as the contractor’s own products, and whether the
proposal provided the plaintiff with a right to share in future
70
savings.
Applied Companies (“Applied”) entered into a fixed-price contract
with the Army Troop Support Command to supply 36,000 BTU/HR
71
horizontal air-conditioners. The contract incorporated by reference
72
Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.248-1, Value Engineering (“VE”),
which provided in pertinent part, “[t]he Contractor is encouraged to
develop, prepare, and submit value engineering change proposals
(VECP’s) voluntarily.
The Contractor shall share in any net
acquisition savings realized from accepted VECP’s, in accordance
73
with the incentive sharing rates in paragraph (f) below.”
Four years later, in 1989, Applied suggested to the government that
it replace certain parts in the Applied air-conditioner with
74
commercial parts. Applied submitted a VECP, listing the specific
commercial part substitutions for its air-conditioner.
The
government conditionally accepted the VECP, and a year later
75
calculated Applied’s share of the savings to be $1,540,181.
In 1995, Applied submitted a claim to the Army, stating that it was
entitled to half of the anticipated savings for the use of commercial
64. 456 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
65. 457 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
66. 449 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
67. 465 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
68. Gardiner, Kamya & Associates, P.C. v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
69. 456 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
70. Id. at 1381-82.
71. Id. at 1381.
72. 48 C.F.R. 52.248-1 (1984).
73. 456 F.3d at 1381. Paragraph (f) entitled the contractor to “fifty percent of
the net acquisition savings under the current contract and future contracts.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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parts in all twenty three air-conditioning models covered by military
76
specification MIL-A-52767. Applied recognized that its VECP was
limited to only the Applied air-conditioners, but argued that it was
entitled to share in cost savings “for the concept proposed by Applied
77
in the VECP.”
In November 1996, the contracting officer denied Applied’s claim.
In October 2001, the parties settled the issue of current savings,
78
leaving only future savings in dispute. The Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (“ASBCA” or “the Board”) awarded one million
dollars to Applied, which was fifty percent of the future savings
relating to Applied’s air-conditioner, but denied the claim for future
79
savings on models other than Applied’s.
Applied appealed the
Board’s decision with respect to the future savings on other airconditioner models.
On Appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the language of the VECP
unambiguously lists only the contract for the Applied air-conditioner
80
within the scope of the proposal. While the VE clause would have
allowed the parties to apply the VECP to the entire family of air81
conditioners, the parties in this case did not do so. Instead, the
VECP and its modifications encompassed only the Applied air82
conditioner. The court additionally found that the clear language
of modifications nine and fifteen to the VECP provided that Applied
83
was not entitled to share in future savings.
Finally, the court
rejected Applied’s assertion that it is entitled to share in the cost
savings from the government’s implementation of its idea of
commercialization: “the submission of a VECP does not confer any
84
proprietary right in the ‘concept’ of the proposal.” Thus, Applied’s
entitlement is limited to the terms of its VECP.
Since the VECP agreement between the parties unambiguously
stated that Applied was not entitled to future savings, the court
affirmed the Board’s decision denying Applied’s claim for future
85
savings on other air-conditioner models.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1381-82.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id. (quoting M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 31 F.3d 1163, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 1385.
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B. Lear Siegler Services, Inc. v. Rumsfeld
86

In Lear Siegler Services, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, the Federal Circuit reversed
a decision of the ASBCA and held that under the Price Adjustment
Clause, the Air Force was required to compensate Lear Siegler
Services, Inc. (“LSI”) for increased costs of providing its employees
with a “defined-benefit health plan,” which was mandated by a
87
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
LSI and the Air Force entered into a contract under which LSI
would provide aircraft maintenance services at Sheppard Air Force
88
Base in Texas. The contract was subject to the Service Contract Act
89
90
(“SCA”), which protects wages and benefits of service workers.
Additionally, the contract incorporated an SCA wage/benefit
determination set forth in the CBA between the Air Force and LSI’s
91
predecessor, Lockheed Martin. The contract also included a Price
92
Adjustment Clause, which required the government to pay LSI for
“increase[s] . . . in applicable . . . fringe benefits . . . made to comply
93
with . . . [the] wage determination.”
Under the SCA, the Secretary of Labor issues “wage
determinations” specifying prevailing wages for each class of service
94
worker employed in a locality. Contractors cannot pay less than the
95
wage determinations.
A similar SCA provision applies to fringe
96
benefits. “[T]he SCA prevents contractors from underbidding each
97
other . . . by cutting wages or fringe benefits to its service workers.”
Moreover, there is a “successor contractor rule” that requires a
successor contractor to pay its employees at least as much as its
98
predecessor paid under its CBA.
In the case at bar, LSI was a
successor to Lockheed Martin during its base year and a successor to
99
itself during the option year.
LSI’s collective bargaining agreement required a defined benefit
health plan, which obligated LSI to expend the resources necessary
86. 457 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 1264.
88. Id. at 1265.
89. Service Contract Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–286, 79 Stat. 1034 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. § 351–358 (2000)).
90. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., 457 F.3d at 1265.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-43(d)(1) (2006)).
94. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1).
95. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., 457 F.3d at 1266 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1)).
96. Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1267 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 353(c)).
99. Id.
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to provide its employees with an agreed-upon level of benefits.
During the course of performance, LSI’s costs of providing the
agreed-upon level of benefits increased, and LSI submitted a request
for a price adjustment pursuant to the SCA Price Adjustment
101
Clause.
The Air Force denied the request, and LSI brought its
claim to the ASBCA. The Board denied LSI’s claim, distinguishing
between increases in an employer’s cost of providing the benefit and
102
increases in the benefits themselves.
The ASBCA held that
increases in the costs of providing the same level of benefits do not
103
trigger the Price Adjustment Clause.
On Appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the Price Adjustment
Clause is triggered not only when the employee receives greater
benefits, but also where the cost to the employer of providing the
104
benefits increases. The court explained that the Price Adjustment
Clause states that “[t]he contract price or contract unit price labor
rates will be adjusted to reflect the Contractor’s actual increase or
105
decrease in applicable wages and fringe benefits.” Thus, the plain
language of the clause focuses on the cost to the contractor rather
106
than the benefit to the employee. Second, the court noted that this
reading is consistent with other portions of the SCA scheme that
measure benefits in terms of cost to the employer rather than value
107
to the employee.
Furthermore, this outcome was consistent with
prior Federal Circuit case law, which held that a contractor was
entitled to a price adjustment under the contract where it had
increased costs during the first option year because more of its
employees were eligible for vacation benefits, even though the level
108
of vacation benefits did not change.
In sum, the court held that “the Price Adjustment Clause is
triggered by changes in an employer’s cost of compliance with the
terms of a wage determination. The fact that there has been no
109
nominal change in the mandated benefit . . . is simply irrelevant.”

100. Id. at 1265.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1268.
105. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-43(d) (2006)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4.177(a)(3) (2006) (measuring equivalency of fringe
benefits in terms of the cost to the employer)).
108. Id. (citing United States v. Serv. Ventures, Inc., 899 F.2d 1, 2–3 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
109. Id. at 1269 (emphasis omitted).
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Medlin Construction Group, Ltd. v. Harvey
110

In Medlin Construction Group, Ltd. v. Harvey, the Federal Circuit
held that the contractor was “entitled to an equitable adjustment in
the amount of the [increased] costs associated with supplying
concrete” rather than polystyrene retainers in performance of a
111
construction contract.
In July 2002, the Army awarded Medlin a fixed-price contract for
112
construction of a vehicle maintenance facility at Fort Hood, Texas.
The contract specifications allowed the contractor to choose between
two types of retainers: polystyrene rigid insulation and precast
113
concrete.
The contract drawings, however, show only precast
114
concrete and not polystyrene retainers. The contract incorporated
Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.236-21, Specifications and
Drawings for Construction, which provides, in pertinent part:
“Anything mentioned in the specifications and not shown on the
drawings, or shown on the drawings and not mentioned in the
specifications, shall be of like effect as if shown or mentioned in both.
In case of difference [sic] between drawings and specifications, the
115
specifications shall govern.”
During the course of the contract, the Army informed Medlin that
116
Medlin was required to install concrete retainers at all grade beams.
Medlin responded that it interpreted the contract as giving it the
option of supplying polystyrene or concrete retainers, and that in
preparing its bid for the fixed-price contract, Medlin had assumed
117
that it would provide the less expensive polystyrene retainers. The
Army replied that the drawing, which showed only the concrete
118
retainer, limited Medlin’s choice and required it to use concrete.
Medlin was forced to supply the concrete retainers at an additional
119
expense.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the ASBCA held that
there was no conflict between the specifications and the drawings and

110. 449 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
111. Id. at 1204.
112. Id. at 1196.
113. Id. at 1196–97.
114. Id. at 1197.
115. Id. at 1197 (quoting Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236–21(a)
(1997)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1198.
118. See id. (basing its opinion on a lack of conflict between the drawings and
specifications because “the drawings authorize[ed] the use of only one of the
acceptable products”).
119. Id.
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that the contract required Medlin to provide concrete retainers.
121
Medlin appealed the Board’s ruling to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the Board’s summary
judgment determination and found that Medlin was entitled to an
122
equitable adjustment.
The parties agreed that the specifications
123
The
gave the contractor the choice of concrete or polystyrene.
issue was the effect of the drawings, which showed only the concrete
124
retainer.
Because contract interpretation is a question of law, the
125
court reviewed the Board’s decision de novo.
The court first noted that the general rules of contract
126
interpretation apply to contracts with the government. In order to
prevail, a party’s interpretation must be “reasonable.” That is, it must
“assure that no contract provision is made inconsistent, superfluous,
127
or redundant.”
Medlin argued that the drawing and specifications were not in
conflict because the drawing did not explicitly exclude the use of
128
polystyrene retainers.
Rather, the drawing simply provided more
129
detail in the event the contractor chose to use concrete retainers.
The government asserted that the drawing changed the dimensions
listed in the specification for the concrete retainers and “narrowed”
130
the contractor’s choice of retainers by requiring it to use concrete.
The court held that Medlin’s interpretation was the only
reasonable one, that is, it gave meaning to all provisions of the
131
contract.
The court concluded that there was no inconsistency
between the drawing and the specifications and that, read as a whole,
132
the contract allowed Medlin to select which type of retainer to use.
Importantly to the court, the drawings did not expressly state that
133
polystyrene retainers were unacceptable.
Moreover, FAR 52.23621(a), which was incorporated in the contract, stated that if
120. Id. at 1198-99. The Board found the essential facts were undisputed and
considered “only the legal effect” of the specifications and drawings. Id. at 1198.
121. Id. at 1199.
122. Id. at 1204.
123. Id. at 1200.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1200.
127. Id. (quoting Lockheed Martin IR Imaging Sys., Inc. v. West, 108 F.3d 319, 322
(1997)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1201.
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information appears in either the specifications or the drawings it
134
“‘shall be of like effect as if shown or mentioned in both.’” Thus,
the fact that the polystyrene retainers were not included in the
drawings was not dispositive. Because the Army should have
permitted Medlin to supply polystyrene retainers, Medlin was entitled
to an equitable adjustment for the increased cost of providing the
135
concrete retainers.
The court noted that even if it accepted the government’s
argument, Medlin would still prevail.
The government’s
interpretation would place the specifications and drawings in direct
136
conflict.
Under the contract’s Order of Precedence Clause, the
specifications, which provided for the choice of retainer, would
137
govern.
D. TEG-Paradigm Environmental, Inc. v. United States
138

In TEG-Paradigm Environmental, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit held that under a contract to perform asbestos abatement
work, the contractor was required to clean debris and residue from
139
pores and cracks of the apartment complex buildings.
TEG-Paradigm (“TEG”) entered into a fixed price contract with
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to
perform asbestos abatement work at an apartment complex in San
Francisco, California, so that the buildings could be imploded
140
safely. During performance of the contract, disputes arose between
TEG and HUD regarding whether the contract required TEG to
abate asbestos in the pores and cracks of the buildings’ surfaces and
whether TEG’s performance was governed by the specifications or its
work plan.
The case came before the Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”) on
141
cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court was faced with
three issues: (1) whether the contract required the removal of
asbestos residue in pores and cracks, (2) whether TEG was required
to follow the contract specifications rather than its work plan, and (3)
whether TEG was entitled to an equitable adjustment for removing
134. Id. (quoting Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-21 (1997).
135. Id. at 1204.
136. Id. at 1203.
137. Id. at 1203-04.
138. 465 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1332 (noting that TEG was awarded the contract on May 8, 2007, for
a fixed price of $5,153,625.00).
141. Id. at 1331.
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142

what it contends were excessive amounts of asbestos. The court first
held that the asbestos did have to be removed from pores and cracks.
The court next held that the contract specifications govern, not
TEG’s work plan. Lastly, the court ruled in favor of TEG on its
143
“excess quantities” claim. TEG appealed the court’s adverse rulings
to the Federal Circuit. The government did not appeal the court’s
144
determination on the “excess quantities” claim.
The Federal Circuit first addressed whether TEG was required
under the contract to abate asbestos in pores and cracks of the
buildings’ surfaces. The court set out the legal standard for contract
interpretation, explaining that contract language must be given a
145
reasonable meaning. Contract terms are generally to be given their
“plain and ordinary” meaning and the court may not use extrinsic
146
evidence to interpret the terms of an unambiguous contract.
However, extrinsic evidence may be used to “confirm that the parties
147
intended for the term to have its plain and ordinary meaning.”
Furthermore, courts are permitted to use evidence of trade practice
148
to interpret even an unambiguous term. Trade practice, however,
cannot be used to create an ambiguity where there otherwise was
149
none. Armed with these canons of construction, the court turned
to its analysis of the contract.
The court first addressed what abatement standard the contract
required.
The original specifications contained two different
150
abatement standards; friable materials were to be cleaned so that
no traces of debris or residue were visible, and nonfriable materials
were to be cleaned until no residue is visible other than that
151
embedded in pores, cracks, or other small voids below the surface.
Thus, there was originally a stricter standard for friable materials.
142. Id. at 1334 (citing TEG-Paradigm Envtl., Inc. v. United States, No. 00-507C, slip
op. at 10 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 30, 2002)).
143. TEG-Environmental, 465 F.3d at 1335-36.
144. Id. at 1336
145. See id. at 1338 (stating that when interpreting a contract, “the language of the
contract must be given that meaning that would be derived from the contract by a
reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporaneous
circumstances”).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1332 (stating that “friable materials, when dry, can be crumbled,
pulverized, or reduced to powder by applying hand pressure”).
151. See id. (quoting the original asbestos abatement standard set forth at section
2080, 4.3 of the disputed contract).
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The specifications were later revised, deleting the more lenient
standard for nonfriable material and adopting the more stringent
152
The revision was in
standard for all asbestos-containing material.
part spurred by questions from TEG’s representatives in a pre-bid
conference call in which TEG discussed the differences between the
153
two standards contained in the original specifications.
Based on
that discussion, the court found that TEG understood that the
abatement standard in the revised specifications required that no
154
asbestos remain in the pores and cracks.
The next issue was whether any dust or powder found during
inspection was assumed to be asbestos-containing debris or residue
155
such that it had to be abated.
Relying on a trade practice in the
asbestos-abatement field that debris and residue is “assumed” to
156
contain asbestos, the court held that TEG was required to clean all
visible powder and dust found during inspection, including that
157
found in cracks and pores.
The court then addressed whether the contract specifications or
TEG’s work plan governed contract performance. The government
had requested the work plan as part of the solicitation process so that
158
it could assess TEG’s ability to perform the contract.
While the
work plan was physically attached to the contract, nowhere did the
contract provide that the work plan would be incorporated into the
159
contract or supersede the contract specifications.
Consequently,
the court found that the work plan was extrinsic evidence that
160
predated the formation of the contract.
Thus, under the parol
161
evidence rule, the work plan could not be used to contradict or
162
modify the contract.

152. See id. at 1333, 1339 (noting that the original specifications expressly allowed
for the contractor to leave non-friable asbestos in pores, cracks or other small voids
below the surface of the material).
153. See id. at 1340 (citing TEG representatives who noted the significant
difference between cleaning the asbestos to a degree where there is no trace or to a
degree that material can still be embedded in pores, cracks, and voids).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. (relying on the ASTM standard).
157. Id. at 1341.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1342.
161. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1139 (7th ed. 1999) (defining parol evidence as
the principle that “a writing intended by the parties to be a final embodiment of
their agreement cannot be modified by evidence of earlier or contemporaneous
agreements that might add to, vary, or contradict the writing”).
162. TEG-Environmental, 465 F.3d at 1342 (ruling that work plans are not
incorporated into government contracts).
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Lastly, the court noted that its holding is consistent with the
principle that the government is entitled to strict compliance with its
specifications, which prevents contractors from submitting low bids
and then supplying lower-cost materials than those required by the
163
specifications.
E. Gardiner, Kamya & Associates, P.C. v. Jackson
164

In Gardiner, Kamya & Associates, P.C. v. Jackson, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Contract Appeals
(“BCA”) and held that a task order modification under which the
contractor agreed to complete unfinished work did not provide for
165
retroactive repricing of work already performed.
In May 1993, Gardiner, Kamya & Associates (“GKA”) and HUD
entered into an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for
performance of assorted accounting services to “ensure the integrity
of [HUD’s] Single Family Mortgage Insurance Program and to
166
protect the insurance fund.” The contract did not specify the work
167
Instead, the details of specific tasks, including
to be performed.
pricing, were set forth in separately negotiated task orders under the
168
contract.
In March 1996, the parties executed two task orders under which
GKA would review 374 post-claims and conduct follow-up reviews to
169
ensure that mortgagees complied with HUD’s requirements.
The
contract provided for GKA to be paid a “fixed unit price” for each
claim that it reviewed. GKA would be paid upon submission of an
170
invoice.
The period of performance under the task orders was
171
fifteen months.
During negotiation of the task orders, there was disagreement over
the unit prices that HUD proposed. The unit prices were computed
by multiplying the estimated number of hours it would take to review
a claim by the hourly rate of the employees who would perform the
172
tasks.
HUD estimated the hours based on a prior contract with
163. See id. (quoting Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998, 1006-07 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)).
164. 467 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1349.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1349-50.
172. Id. at 1350.
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another contractor.
GKA objected to the unit prices because it
believed that the review would take longer than estimated and
174
therefore GKA would incur higher costs. However, HUD refused to
change the unit price, and GKA eventually agreed to perform the
175
work at the proposed price.
Contract performance fell behind schedule and GKA did not
176
complete the reviews in the fifteen months allotted.
Thus, the
parties executed Modification 2, extending performance under the
177
Modification 2 also
task orders for an additional six months.
provided that the unit prices for the extended period would remain
the same as the unit prices under the original task orders “pending
178
results of [an] audit and subsequent negotiations.” Thereafter, the
Defense Contract Audit Agency conducted an audit and found that
GKA’s actual hours worked were higher than the estimates that
179
formed the basis of the unit prices.
HUD therefore agreed to
180
adjust the prices for the extended period.
The issue on appeal was whether Modification 2 permitted a
retroactive price increase for the work completed prior to the
181
execution of the modification.
The Board of Contract Appeals
(“BCA”), interpreting the contract under the doctrine of contra
proferentum, held that Modification 2 did not provide for a retroactive
182
price adjustment.
The Federal Circuit concurred with the BCA’s conclusion but
disagreed with its analysis. The court explained that contra proferentum
183
is an interpretive doctrine of last resort. In interpreting a contract,
the court must first determine whether the agreement is
184
Looking at the plain language of the contract, the
ambiguous.
185
court found that Modification 2 was not ambiguous.
The fact that Modification 2 used the terms “continue service” and
“extend performance” suggested to the court that the modification
186
was “forward looking, not retroactive.”
Moreover, the language
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
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relating to pricing addressed unit prices for the extended period but
was silent regarding retroactive adjustments for work already
187
The court noted that it could not interpret the
completed.
modification’s silence on retroactivity as an ambiguity in the
188
agreement. Rather, the fact that the modification did not address
retroactivity was further evidence that it was not intended to provide
such relief to GKA. The court also noted that the effective date of
the modification, July 1, 1997 (rather than the March 1, 1996,
effective date of the task orders), cut against GKA’s argument that it
189
was intended to provide for retroactive price adjustments.
The
court concluded its analysis by noting that even if the contract was
ambiguous, the negotiation history between the parties regarding the
unit prices established that the modification was not intended to
190
apply retroactively.
III. COSTS
The Federal Circuit decided four precedential cost cases in 2006.
In Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff,191 the court considered the
applicability of the interest provision of the Contract Disputes Act in
denying a contractor’s claim for interest on an award of back wages
owed by the government to the contractor’s former employees. In
Information Systems & Networks Corp. v. United States,192 the court
considered whether state income taxes paid by the sole shareholder
of a subchapter S Corporation were an allowable cost under 48 C.F.R.
§ 31.205-41. In Wynne v. United Technologies Corp.,193 the court held
that the government must demonstrate reliance on defective data
submitted by a contractor in order to recover on a Truth in
Negotiations Act claim. Finally, in United Pacific Insurance Company v.
United States,194 the court affirmed the dismissal of a Miller Act surety’s
claim to recover excess contract completion costs it incurred in
completing a contract on a theory of quantum meruit, holding that
the statutes on which the surety relied did not give rise to a private
cause of action for contract invalidation.

187.
188.
189.
190.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 1354.
Id. (citing New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998)).
Id.
Id.
437 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
437 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
463 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
464 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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A. Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff
195

In Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, the Federal Circuit held
196
that the interest provision of the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) did
not permit a contractor to recover interest on an award of back wages
owed by the government to the contractor’s former employees where
197
the contractor never actually paid any of those back wages.
In 1990 and 1991, Richlin Security Service Company (“Richlin”)
entered into two fixed-price contracts with the Immigration and
198
Naturalization Service (“INS”) to provide private security-guard
199
Due to a mutual mistake, the contract misclassified the
services.
Richlin security guards for purposes of the wage classification scheme
200
under the Service Contract Act (“SCA”).
As a result, Richlin’s
201
security guards were underpaid.
In 1995, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) determined that
202
Richlin’s security guards were eligible for back pay under the SCA.
In 1998, Richlin and the DOL entered into an agreement specifying
how Richlin’s security guards would be compensated for the back
203
wages owed.
Specifically, the agreement provided that: (1)
Richlin’s security guards were owed $638,818.72 in back wages, (2)
the back wages would be paid into an escrow account to be
administered by Richlin’s counsel and distributed to the security
guards, (3) any excess funds would be remitted to the DOL, and (4)
by virtue of the agreement, Richlin’s obligations to its former
204
employees would be liquidated and satisfied.
After a subsequent appeal and remand, the Department of
Transportation Board of Contract Appeals (“the Board”) awarded
Richlin the amount of back wages owed pursuant to the DOL-Richlin
205
agreement.
The Board also found that Richlin was entitled to

195.
196.
197.
198.

437 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
41 U.S.C. § 611 (2000).
Richlin, 437 F.3d at 1302.
See 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 1.1 (Mathew Bender, Rev. Ed., Lexis Nexis
2006) (noting that the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135 (2002), abolished the INS and divided its functions into three bureaus: the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (“BCIS”); the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“BICE”); and the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (“BCBP”)).
199. Richlin, 437 F.3d at 1297.
200. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-258 (2006).
201. Richlin, 437 F.3d at 1297.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1298.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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206

payroll taxes associated with the back wages. Following distribution
of the back wages and payment of the associated tax liability out of
the escrow fund, Richlin petitioned the Board for interest pursuant
207
to the CDA’s interest provision, 41 U.S.C. § 611. The Board denied
Richlin’s request on the ground that “there [was] nothing upon
which interest could accrue” because the amounts awarded were not
due to Richlin but instead, were amounts found due to Richlin’s
security guards and the tax authorities, and Richlin had not
208
“advance[d] its own funds to pay” the back wages. Richlin appealed
209
the Board’s denial of interest to the Federal Circuit.
210
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s denial of interest. The
court first reviewed two prior Federal Circuit decisions considering
the types of awards that could accrue interest under section 611 as
211
“amounts found due contractors.” The court concluded that theses
decisions did not support the contention that section 611 “permits
interest to accrue on costs . . . that were never actually incurred by the
212
contractor.”
The court thus rejected Richlin’s argument that “the
plain meaning of ‘amounts found due contractors’ in section 611
include[d] any amount (1) for which the contractor was liable and
213
(2) that was ‘awarded’ to a contractor on a CDA claim.” The court
explained that under both the legislative history of section 611 and
the court’s prior decisions, a “contractor can recover interest only on
214
amounts it actually paid.”
While the court agreed that Richlin’s
contract obligated it to pay its employees the amounts required by
the SCA and to pay associated payroll taxes to the proper tax
215
authorities, Richlin had not made those payments.
Instead, both
the back wages and the associated payroll taxes had been paid by the
government through its payments into the escrow account, which
were then used to pay Richlin’s security guards and the tax
216
authorities. Indeed, Richlin had acted “merely as a conduit” for the

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1299.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1302.
211. Id. at 1299-1300 (discussing the decisions in Servidone Construction Corp. v.
United States, 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and Raytheon Co. v. White, 305 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
212. Id. at 1299 (quoting Raytheon Co., 305 F.3d at 1365).
213. Id. at 1300.
214. Id. at 1301-02.
215. Id. at 1301.
216. Id.
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217

disbursement of these funds and “did not advance a penny of its
218
The court thus
own money” in support of these payments.
concluded that because the Board’s award “did not compensate
Richlin for any past, present or future out-of-pocket expense,” Richlin
219
was not entitled to receive interest under section 611.
B. Information Systems & Networks Corp. v. United States
220

In Information Systems & Networks Corp. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit held that state income taxes paid by the sole shareholder of a
subchapter S corporation were not an allowable cost under a costreimbursement contract between the subchapter S Corporation and
the United States because the sole shareholder was not the
221
contracting entity.
Information Systems and Networks Corporation (“ISN”) was a
Maryland subchapter S corporation that provided services to the
222
United States under several cost-reimbursement contracts.
As a
223
subchapter S corporation, ISN did not have to pay state income tax.
Instead, ISN’s sole shareholder, who received dividend income from
224
The issue under
ISN, paid state income tax on those dividends.
consideration was whether the state income taxes paid by the
shareholder constituted allowable costs under ISN’s cost225
reimbursement contracts pursuant to 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-41.
ISN submitted claims for reimbursement under its costreimbursement contracts for costs associated with the shareholder
226
state income tax payments.
The Defense Council Audit Agency
denied ISN’s claims, finding that “because ISN was an S corporation
and not subject to state income taxes, the state income taxes paid by
227
[the shareholder] were not allowable costs for ISN.”
The
228
contracting officer thus denied ISN’s claims for reimbursement.
ISN filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”), alleging
that it had reimbursed the shareholder for her state income tax
217. Id. at 1302.
218. Id. at 1301.
219. Id. at 1302.
220. 437 F.3d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
221. See id. at 1177 (owing to the fact that the state tax liabilities were described as
penalties and encumbrances).
222. Id. at 1174.
223. Id. at 1175 (noting that electing to be a subchapter corporation subjects the
corporation only to one level of taxation, at the shareholder level).
224. Id.
225. Id.; 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-41 (2004).
226. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 437 F.3d at 1175.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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payments and that such costs should be allowable under its cost229
The COFC agreed, holding that state
reimbursement contracts.
income tax payments made by the sole shareholder of a subchapter S
230
corporation were allowable costs under 48 C.F.R. § 1.205-41(a).
The COFC concluded that under section 31.205-41(b), taxes were
not allowable costs when they are subject to a reduction or an
231
abatement.
Moreover, under section 31.205(a), state taxes are an
allowable cost when they are required to be paid and are in fact
232
The COFC thus concluded that, because “the state income
paid.
taxes were required to be paid and were paid, and because the tax
liability on the corporate income was not subject to abatement or
reduction, the state income taxes claimed by the plaintiff for
233
reimbursement [were] allowed.”
234
First, the
The Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision.
court rejected the COFC’s interpretation of section 31.205-41(b),
stating that the language of that section “makes it clear that the term
exemption ‘means freedom from taxation in whole or in part’” and is
235
not limited to tax abatements and reductions.
Second, the court found that allowable taxes under 31.205-41(a)
236
“apply to taxes paid by the contracting entity.”
ISN was the
contracting entity and, as a subchapter S corporation, it never paid
237
state income taxes. The shareholder paid state income taxes on her
ISN dividends, but because she was not the contracting entity under
section 31.205-41(a), her state income tax payments were not an
238
allowable cost for ISN under section 31.205-41(b).
C. Wynne v. United Technologies Corp.
239

In Wynne v. United Technologies Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the ASBCA’s decision denying the Air Force’s claim for a contract

229. Id. at 1176.
230. Id.; 48 C.F.R. §1.205-41(a) (2004).
231. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 437 F.3d at 1176.
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 265, 270
(2000)).
234. Id. at 1177-78.
235. Id. at 1177 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-41(b) (2004)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 463 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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price reduction under the Truth in Negotiations Act (“TINA”),
holding that reliance on defective data is a necessary element of a
241
TINA claim.
In proceedings before the Board, the Air Force argued that it was
entitled to a contract price reduction of approximately threehundred million dollars on a six-year, multi-billion dollar contract
because the contractor, United Technologies (“UTech”), had
furnished defective cost or pricing data in connection with both its
242
initial price proposal and its best-and-final offer (“BAFO”).
The
Board concluded that UTech had furnished defective cost or pricing
243
data on which the government had relied to its detriment.
However, the defective data caused an increase in the contract price
in some instances, and a decrease in other instances, such that “the
contract price reductions to which the Air Force was entitled were
244
exceeded by the offsets to which UTech was entitled.” The Board
therefore concluded that the Air Force was not entitled to any
245
recovery.
UTech moved for reconsideration of the Board’s initial decision,
arguing that the Board’s reliance analysis improperly focused on
UTech’s cost and pricing data submitted with its initial price
246
proposal, which the Air Force had not accepted.
Instead, the Air
247
Force accepted UTech’s BAFO and subsequent revised offers.
Thus, the Board should have focused on “whether the [Air Force]
248
relied on the defective BAFO cost or pricing data.”
The Board agreed with UTech, finding that the contract price for
the base year of the contract was based on UTech’s BAFO, not its
249
initial price proposal.
The Board went on to explain that the Air
Force “was entitled to a presumption that ‘the natural and probable
consequence of defective cost or pricing data is to cause an overstated
250
price.’”
The Board found that “UTech had rebutted this
presumption by demonstrating that the Air Force did not rely upon
240. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1983). The court analyzed the 1983 version of TINA
because that was the version in effect at the time the contractor furnished its initial
price proposal and best-and-final offer to the Air Force. Wynne, 463 F.3d at 1262 n.1.
241. Id. at 1265.
242. Id. at 1263.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. (quoting In re United Techs. Corp., 05-1 B.C.A. 32,860 (A.S.B.C.A. 2005)
(“Reconsideration Decision”).
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 2-3).
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the allegedly defective cost or pricing data in agreeing to any contract
251
price.”
Similarly, the Board found that for the five years beyond the base
year of the contract, “competitive forces, rather than defective 1983
BAFO cost or pricing data were relied upon to make the awards and
252
to exercise the options.” Because the Air Force failed to show that
anyone in the government reviewed—much less relied on—UTech’s
BAFO cost or pricing data in making the awards to UTech, the Board
held that the Air Force failed to meet its burden of proof that the
defective cost or pricing data had caused an increase in the contract
253
price.
On appeal, the Air Force did not challenge the Board’s factual
findings, but rather, argued that it was “never necessary to establish
that [the government] relied upon the defective cost or pricing data
to its detriment, as it is sufficient to establish that the contract price
offered by UTech was calculated using the defective cost or pricing
254
data.”
255
Relying on Singer Co., Librascope
The Federal Circuit disagreed.
256
Division v. United States, the court found it well-settled that under
TINA, the question is both whether the contractor furnished
inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current cost or pricing data and
whether the government relied on the inaccurate cost or pricing data
257
to its detriment. The court rejected the Air Force’s argument that
the causation element of TINA can be established solely by
demonstrating that the defective cost or pricing data influenced the
258
final contract price. The court explained that in both cases relied
259
on by the government, the contractor had failed to rebut the
presumption that the government had relied on the inaccurate cost
260
or pricing data to its detriment.
Here, in contrast, the contractor
had rebutted the presumption of reliance, which the Air Force failed

251. Id.
252. Id. at 1264 (quoting Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 5).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1265.
255. Id.
256. 576 F.2d 905 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
257. 463 F.3d at 1265.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing to both Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 479 F.2d 1342 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 432 F.2d 801 (Ct. Cl. 1970) in
support of its argument).
260. Id. at 1266.
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to challenge with additional evidence or arguments in support of
261
reliance.
The court found additional support for its decision in the 1986
262
legislative history of TINA. Congress had considered and rejected a
proposed bill that would have eliminated the reliance requirement
under TINA, which would have changed the rebuttable presumption
263
of reliance into a conclusive presumption.
Notably, the court
found the 1986 legislative history reflected Congress’s recognition
that, prior to 1986, the government could not recover on a TINA
claim if it had not relied on the allegedly defective cost or pricing
264
data.
In rejecting the proposed amendment, “Congress codified
the [then existing] reliance requirement as a defense to a TINA
265
claim.”
Finally, the court summarily rejected the Air Force’s argument that
the Board erred in finding that UTech had rebutted the presumption
266
of reliance. Specifically, the Air Force argued that the presumption
of reliance could not be rebutted where the defective cost or pricing
267
The court
data had been used to calculate the contract price.
found that this argument was explicitly foreclosed by the court’s
268
decision in Universal Restoration, Inc. v. United States, in which the
court concluded that the contractor had successfully rebutted the
presumption of reliance even where defective pricing data had been
269
used to calculate the contract price. Noting that the Air Force was
not challenging the Board’s factual findings, nor was it claiming it
had relied on UTech’s defective cost or pricing data in making the
contract awards, the court affirmed the Board’s decision rejecting the
270
government’s TINA claim.
D. United Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States
271

In United Pacific Insurance Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a Miller Act surety’s claim to invalidate a
contract and recover costs it incurred over and above the original
261. Id. at 1267.
262. Id. at 1266.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub.
L. No. 99-661, § 952, 100 Stat. 3816, 3945-49 (1986) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
2306a(d)(2) (2006))).
266. Id. at 1267.
267. Id.
268. 798 F.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
269. 463 F.3d at 1265 (citing Universal Restoration, 798 F.2d at 1402, 1406).
270. Id. at 1267.
271. 464 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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272

contract price on a theory of quantum meruit, holding that the
congressional oversight statutes that were allegedly violated did not
273
In
give rise to a private cause of action to void the contract.
October 1995, Castle Abatement Corporation (“Castle”) entered into
a construction contract to renovate three buildings at an Air Force
274
Base.
The government agreed to pay Castle $3,152,174 under the
275
276
contract.
In accordance with the Miller Act, United Pacific
Insurance Company (“United Pacific”) as surety, issued a
performance bond in the amount of $3,152,174 and a labor and
277
material bond for $1,576,087.
In 1997, Castle defaulted and the government terminated its
278
United Pacific then “entered into a written takeover
contract.
agreement with the government in which it agreed to complete the
279
contract work.”
United Pacific hired another contractor, who
280
completed the contract for $3,525,757.25. United Pacific, however,
only received $661,512.31 from the government under the contract,
which was the balance the government owed under its original
281
contract with Castle.
In April 2000, United Pacific filed a claim for equitable adjustment,
asking the contracting officer to terminate the contract for
convenience and for the government to pay United Pacific
$3,194,490.59, the amount United Pacific incurred completing the
contract work minus the $661,572.31 the government had already
282
paid.
In support of its claim, United Pacific argued that “the
contract between Castle and the government was void ab initio
283
because it was illegal.”
The contracting officer denied United
284
Pacific’s claim.
272. Id. at 1326. The court defined quantum meriut as “[a] claim or right of
action for the reasonable value of services rendered.” Id. at 1329 (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (8th ed. 2004)).
273. Id. at 1333.
274. Id. at 1326.
275. Id.
276. 40 U.S.C. § 270a-d (1994) (current version at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131-34 (2006)).
Under the Miller Act, prime contractors are required to post performance bonds on
all federal construction contracts as well as to post labor and material bonds to
protect all persons supplying labor and materials. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at
1326 n.2.
277. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at 1326.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1326-27.
283. Id. at 1327.
284. Id.
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United Pacific appealed the contracting officer’s decision to the
285
The Board dismissed United Pacific’s claim, holding that
ASBCA.
United Pacific lacked standing “to assert Castle’s pre-takeover claim
286
that the contract was illegal.”
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit
287
decided Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. England, in which it held
that the Board did not have “jurisdiction over equitable subrogation
claims based on events that took place before a takeover
288
agreement.”
In light of this decision, the Board issued a
reconsideration decision in which it dismissed United Pacific’s claim
for lack of jurisdiction, holding that “United Pacific was not a
‘contractor’ within the meaning of the Contracts Disputes Act with
289
respect to pre-takeover agreement events.”
The Federal Circuit
290
affirmed.
In January 2005, “United Pacific filed suit in the COFC under the
Tucker Act, alleging that the contract between Castle and the
government was illegal and, thus, void ab initio, because it was in
291
violation of 10 U.S.C. §§ 2805 and 2811.”
United Pacific claimed
that “as the completing surety, it was entitled to recover its excess
292
costs of completion on a quantum meruit basis.”
The COFC
dismissed United Pacific’s suit for failure to state a claim, relying on
the Federal Circuit’s decision in American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
293
United States (“AT&T III”).
United Pacific appealed the court’s
294
dismissal to the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, United Pacific again argued that the contract was illegal
and thus void because the government used operation and
maintenance funds “in clear violation of 10 U.S.C. § 2805, which
absolutely prohibited use of operation and maintenance funds (‘O &
M funds’) for unspecified repairs exceeding $300,000, and 10 U.S.C.
§ 2811, which prohibited use of O & M funds in any amount for any
295
new construction.”
United Pacific relied on United States v.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 313 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
288. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Fireman’s Fund, 313 F.3d at
1352).
289. Id. at 1327.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 177 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
294. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at 1327.
295. Id. at 1329 (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants United Pacific Insurance
Company, Reliance Insurance Company, and Reliance National at 10). The court
evaluated sections 2805 and 2811 as they were in effect in 1995 when the contract
between Castle and the government was formed. Id. at 1326 n.1.

GOVERNMENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007

4/7/2007 11:14:36 AM

2006 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT SUMMARY
296

1103

297

Amdahl and Godley v. United States in support of its argument that
“the [g]overnment must pay for the benefits it has received and
accepted from the surety because . . . United Pacific completed the
illegal/void [c]ontract in good faith without knowledge of the
illegality, costs which would not have been incurred but for the illegal
298
In contrast, the
[c]ontract and violation of public policy.”
government argued that neither United Pacific nor Castle was
entitled to have the contract declared void under section 2805 or
2811 and, further, that United Pacific’s suit was barred by the holding
299
in AT&T III.
The Federal Circuit first looked to the plain language of sections
2805 and 2811, noting that neither statute provided for the
300
invalidation of a contract based on a violation of the statutes. The
court next looked to the legislative history, finding that the purpose
of the statutes was not “to enable contractors to assert private causes
of action to void contracts with the government that violate the
statutes,” but rather, to provide for “agency flexibility through
decentralization” and to “limit[] . . . spending and waste through
301
Congressional oversight.”
Thus, the court concluded that its
302
decision in AT&T III foreclosed United Pacific’s claim.
The court explained that AT&T III held that invalidation of a
contract was “not a necessary consequence when a statute or
regulation [was violated], but must be considered in light of the
statutory or regulatory purpose, with recognition of the strong policy
of supporting the integrity of contracts made by and with the United
303
States.” More specifically, where the statute itself did not explicitly
provide the remedy of invalidation, the underlying purpose of the
304
statute must be considered in determining the appropriate remedy.
As noted above, the purposes of the statutes at issue here were not to

296. 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
297. 5 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
298. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants
United Pacific Insurance Company, Reliance Insurance Company, and Reliance
National at 12).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1330.
301. Id. at 1331.
302. Id. at 1333 (“In our view, AT&T III compels the conclusion that United
Pacific is not entitled to the relief it seeks . . . .”).
303. Id. at 1332 (quoting AT&T III, 177 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Circ. 1999)).
304. Id.
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provide for a private cause of action for contract invalidation.
306
Thus, United Pacific failed to state a claim for relief.
United Pacific argued that AT&T III was distinguishable in that the
legislative history of the statute at issue in that case had “explicitly
barred any private cause of action,” whereas the legislative history of
307
sections 2805 and 2811 contained no similar prohibition.
The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding that precedent
disfavored the invalidation of contracts that had been fully or
308
substantially performed by both parties.
Based on a similar rationale of full contract performance, the court
also rejected United Pacific’s reliance on United States v. Amdahl
309
310
Corp. and Godley v. United States.
The court explained that in
Amdahl, the government received the goods and services for which it
had contracted and then sought to avoid payment by claiming that
311
the contract it had entered into was illegal.
In contrast, here, the
government had paid Castle and United Pacific the full amount owed
312
under the contract for the construction performed.
The court
explained that Godley was a breach of contract case, whereas here,
“the government . . . paid in full the amount it agreed to pay Castle
313
under the original contract,” and thus, there was no breach.
Moreover, in Godley, the government had attempted to void the
contract based on alleged fraud or wrongdoing by the contracting
officer, which the Court refused to consider absent “some causal link
314
between the [alleged] illegality and the contract provisions.” Here,
United Pacific had never asserted that the government’s contract with
315
Castle was “tainted by fraud or wrongdoing.”
Thus, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the COFC’s rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of United
316
Pacific’s claim.

305. Id.; see also supra note 301 and accompanying text.
306. United Pacific Ins. Co., 464 F.3d at 1333.
307. Id.
308. See id. (discussing the holdings in AT&T III, as well as United States v. Miss.
Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961)).
309. 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
310. 5 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also United Pacific, 464 F.3d at 1333
(declining to find error in the lower court’s rejection of United Pacific’s argument).
311. Id.
312. See id. at 1334 (“[I]t is undisputed that the government paid Castle and
United Pacific the full amount required by the contract for the construction
performed . . . .”).
313. Id. at 1334-35.
314. Id. at 1334 (quoting Godley, 5 F.3d at 1476).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1335.
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IV. CONTRACT TERMINATION: JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. V.
UNITED STATES
317

In Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
held that upon a termination for convenience, a contractor was
entitled to recover all of its costs rather than just eighty percent, even
though the contract contained a cost-sharing provision that required
the government to pay only eighty percent of the contractor’s
318
performance costs.
Jacobs Engineering (“Jacobs”) inherited a development and
construction contract awarded to its predecessor to “develop, design,
319
fabricate, construct, and install a gasification improvement facility.”
320
The contractor would not receive a fee for its performance.
Instead, the contract contained a cost-sharing provision pursuant to
which the government would pay eighty percent of the contractor’s
costs, and the contractor would be responsible for the remaining
321
twenty percent of the total estimated cost of $28,750,375.
The
contract incorporated the Termination for Convenience Clause at
Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.249-6, which provides that, upon a
termination for convenience, the government must pay the
contractor “[a]ll costs reimbursable under this contract, not
previously paid, for the performance of this contract before the
322
effective date of the termination . . . .”
During contract performance, the government terminated the
323
contract for convenience due to a shortage of funds.
Jacobs
submitted a termination settlement proposal for reimbursement of
324
The government rejected the
one hundred percent of its costs.
proposal and Jacobs’ subsequent claim, limiting recovery to eighty
325
percent based on the cost-sharing provision. Jacobs brought suit at
326
the COFC, challenging the contracting officer’s decision.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the COFC granted the
government’s motion, holding that the Termination for Convenience
clause did not invalidate the cost-sharing provision, but, rather, must
317. 434 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
318. Id. at 1379 (reversing the opinion of the COFC).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1380 (quoting Federal Acquisition Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,717
(May 30, 1986) (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-6(g)(1))).
323. Id. at 1380.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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327

be read in accordance with it.
Accordingly, the COFC held that
only those costs reimbursable under the contract, the eighty percent,
were to be paid to the contractor upon termination for
328
convenience.
Jacobs appealed that decision to the Federal
329
Circuit.
330
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Without
citing legal support, the court held that “the term ‘all costs
reimbursable’ defines the type or kind of costs for which the contract
331
provides reimbursement and not the amount of such costs.”
The
court reasoned that, had the parties intended for the cost-sharing
provision to apply in the event of a Termination for Convenience, the
332
contract would have so stated. Furthermore, the court held that, to
the extent that the phrase “all costs reimbursable” is ambiguous, it
must be construed against the government as the drafter of the
333
contract.
The court’s decision was apparently driven by its view of the
equities. Jacobs maintained that it had entered into this “seemingly
unattractive venture [in] anticipation [of] . . . obtain[ing] valuable
334
patent rights” upon the contract’s completion.
Since the contract
was terminated prior to completion, Jacobs never received those
335
rights. Relying on a decision of the Department of Transportation
336
Board of Contract Appeals, the court concluded that “[i]n these
circumstances it seems unfair to Jacobs to deny it full reimbursement
for the costs of its performance up to the government’s contract
termination, which thwarted its possibility of obtaining the patent
337
rights.”
V. BID PROTESTS
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Rex Service Corp. v. United States338
involved the Tucker Act’s interested-party requirement for purposes
of the COFC’s bid protest jurisdiction. In Rex Service Corp. v. United

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
339.

See id. (discussing the COFC opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Kasler Elec. Co., 84-2 B.C.A. 17,374 (D.O.T.C.A.B. 1984).
Jacobs Engineering, 434 F.3d at 1381.
448 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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339

States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of a protest
340
Because
by Rex Service Corporation (“Rex”) for lack of standing.
341
Rex could have bid on the contract award but chose not to, it was
342
not an interested party under the Tucker Act for purposes of the
COFC’s bid protest jurisdiction.
In July 2003, a subagency of the DOD “issued a request for
proposals (‘2003 RFP’) to supply ‘thumbwheel switches,’ a
343
component in aviation control transponders.” Rex filed an agency
protest arguing that the RFP had disclosed some of its proprietary
344
data.
The DOD cancelled the RFP even though it concluded that
345
no proprietary data had been disclosed.
In September 2004, the DOD issued a second RFP to supply
346
thumbwheel switches.
One day before the close of bidding, Rex
347
again filed an agency protest. Rex argued that the DOD’s violations
348
of the Procurement Integrity Act (“PIA”) had prejudiced Rex and
further argued that any bidder that used information from the prior
349
RFP should be disqualified from the bidding.
Rex did not,
however, submit a bid in response to the 2004 RFP, nor did it argue
350
that the DOD’s violations prevented it from doing so. Rex’s protest
351
was denied, and “Rex did not pursue the matter further.”
In February 2005, the DOD awarded the contract to Associated
352
Aircraft Manufacturing and Sales, Inc. (“Associated Aircraft”).
In
353
March 2005, Rex filed a protest at the COFC under the Tucker Act,
protesting the award to Associated Aircraft and arguing that the DOD
354
“had deviated from the process specified in the 2004 RFP.”
The
COFC dismissed the protest, finding that Rex was not an “interested
party” within the meaning of the Tucker Act, and thus, the court
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1308.
341. Id. at 1306-08.
342. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2000).
343. Rex Service Corp., 448 F.3d at 1306.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1306-07.
346. Id. at 1307.
347. Id.
348. Procurement Integrity Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 423 (2000) (as amended by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 10 U.S.C. § 7420
(1996)).
349. Rex Service Corp., 448 F.3d at 1307.
350. Id. at 1307.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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355

lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Rex appealed the COFC’s
356
dismissal to the Federal Circuit.
In deciding whether Rex was an “interested party” within the
meaning of the Tucker Act, the Federal Circuit first noted that the
term was construed in accordance with the Competition in
357
Contracting Act (“CICA”), which requires that the party be an
“actual or prospective bidder[] . . . whose direct economic interest would be
affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the
358
contract.”
Thus, the court found that in order for Rex to have standing to
protest the award, Rex had to demonstrate: (1) that it was an actual
or prospective bidder, and (2) that it had a direct economic interest
359
in the award of the contract. The court easily concluded that Rex
360
was not an “actual bidder” as it had not bid on the contract.
Nevertheless, Rex argued that it was a prospective bidder
“because . . . it filed an agency protest prior to the close of bidding,
and it was prejudiced, but not prevented from bidding, by alleged
361
violations in the department’s solicitation.”
362
The Federal Circuit disagreed.
Relying on MCI
363
Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, the court explained that, in
order to have standing to protest an award, a party that was not an
actual bidder must demonstrate that it was “expecting to submit an
364
offer prior to the closing date of the solicitation.”
The court
further noted that “the opportunity to qualify . . . as . . . a prospective
365
bidder ends when the proposal period ends.”
Because Rex could have, but did not, submit a bid prior to the
closing date of the solicitation, it could not qualify as a prospective
366
bidder.
Specifically, Rex had not alleged “that it expected to bid
prior to the close of the solicitation period, but was prevented from

355. Id.
356. Id.
357. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56 (2000).
358. Rex Service Corp., 448 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v.
United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
359. Id. at 1307.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1307-08.
362. Id. at 1308 (rejecting Rex’s arguments).
363. 878 F.2d 362, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (construing “interested party” under the
Brooks Automatic Data Processing Act, 40 U.S.C. § 759 (repealed 1996)).
364. Rex Service Corp., 448 F.3d at 1308 (quoting MCI, 878 F.2d at 365, and further
holding that the MCI construction of “interested party” “applies to the Tucker Act
with equal force,” 448 F.3d at 1307).
365. Id. at 1308 (quoting MCI, 878 F.2d at 365).
366. Id.
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367

doing so on the basis of improper agency action.” The fact that Rex
had filed a pre-award agency protest or that alleged violations by the
DOD prejudiced Rex’s ability to bid were irrelevant to the court’s
368
determination of Rex’s standing.
The court further held that Rex did not possess a direct economic
369
interest in the award of the contract. The court explained that, in
order to have the requisite direct economic interest, a prospective
bidder must demonstrate that it had a “‘substantial chance’ of
370
receiving the contract.” Here, Rex did not bid on the contract, nor
did it argue that the DOD would have had to reopen the solicitation
371
if its protest was sustained.
Thus, Rex had no chance of receiving
372
Accordingly, the court affirmed the COFC’s
the contract award.
373
dismissal of Rex’s protest for lack of jurisdiction.
VI. PATENT RIGHTS
One patent case this term involved government contract issues.
374
Zoltek Corp. v. United States concerned the government’s liability for
a government contractor’s alleged intrusion on a third party’s
intellectual property.
A patent owner’s sole remedy for a third party’s unlicensed use of
the patented subject matter in performing a federal contract is a suit
against the government for reasonable compensation under 28
375
376
U.S.C. § 1498 (implemented in FAR § 27.201-1 ). In Zoltek Corp. v.
377
the Federal Circuit discussed what constitutes
United States,
“infringement” for purposes of the government’s liability, and
clarified the applicability of the Fifth Amendment’s Just
378
Compensation Clause with respect to such a claim.
In Zoltek, the United States government entered into contract with
Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”) “to design and build the
379
F-22 fighter.”
Lockheed subcontracted with other companies to
367. Id. (emphasis added).
368. Id.
369. Id. (analyzing the second standing requirement).
370. Id. (quoting Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d
1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
375. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
376. 48 C.F.R. 27.201-1 (2006).
377. 442 F.3d 1345.
378. Id. at 1349-53.
379. Id. at 1349.
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provide two types of silicide fiber sheet products for the aircraft.
The fibers for the first type of product were partially carbonized and
developed into sheets in Japan, then imported into the United
381
States.
The fibers for the second type of product were
382
manufactured in Japan and sent to the United States for processing.
Zoltek alleged that Lockheed’s subcontractors made the fiber
383
products using Zoltek’s patented methods.
Section 1498(a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides that
whenever a patented invention is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without a license from the patent owner, the owner’s
only remedy is an action against the COFC for the recovery of
reasonable compensation for such use or manufacture (e.g.,
384
reasonable royalties). Section 1498(c), on the other hand, provides
that even where a plaintiff meets all of the requirements that
establish a claim for compensation under section 1498(a), the right
to reasonable compensation will not apply to claims arising in a
385
foreign country.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s conclusion that Zoltek’s
claims against the government were barred under section 1498
because the patented steps allegedly used by Lockheed’s
subcontractors were not performed in the United States, but in
386
Japan. Thus, even where a patented process is used to manufacture
goods for the government without a license from the patent holder,
government liability for infringement does not persist under section
1498 when “not all steps of a patented process have been performed
387
in the United States.”
More interesting is the Federal Circuit’s response to the COFC’s
suggestion that the unlicensed use of Zoltek’s patented process to
manufacture goods for the government may constitute a taking
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. The relevant patent is U.S. Reissue Patent No. 34,162 (reissued Jan. 19,
1993) to “Controlled Surface Electrical Resistance Carbon Fiber Sheet Product.” 442
F.3d at 1347.
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Parmatic Filter Corp.,
736 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (D. Me. 1990). Reasonable compensation includes the
owner’s reasonable fees for expert witnesses and attorneys in pursuing the action,
but only if the owner is an independent inventor, a nonprofit organization, or an
entity that had no more than five hundred employees at any time during the five year
period preceding the use of the patented invention by or for the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a).
385. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c).
386. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350.
387. Id. (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
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388

under the Fifth Amendment. Zoltek asked the lower court to apply
389
the rationale of Porter v. United States, which acknowledged that the
United States can be obligated to pay just compensation under a
theory of eminent domain when there is a taking of United States
property overseas by foreign nationals or foreign governments,
provided that “the United States carried out the alleged taking of
390
property.”
The COFC agreed that the infringement constituted a
taking of private property for public use under the Fifth Amendment
391
and maintained jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
The Federal Circuit politely scolded the COFC for recognizing
patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking. In a per curiam
opinion, the Federal Circuit reasoned that applying takings
jurisprudence to patent infringement claims against the government
392
would effectively read section 1498 “out of existence.”
Moreover,
the Supreme Court had rejected an argument in Schillinger v. United
393
States
that a patentee could sue the government for patent
infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act.
The Federal Circuit’s per curiam opinion rejected Judge Plager’s
dissenting view that the Supreme Court had implicitly overruled
394
Schillinger in subsequent rulings.
Congress created section 1498 to compensate patentees for the use
of patented subject matter by or for the federal government, in lieu
of the customary private suit for infringement in federal district
395
court.
In effect, section 1498 allows the government to purchase
goods and services for performance of governmental functions
without the threat that work will be stopped because the contractor is
enjoined for patent infringement. Zoltek reinforces the view that
section 1498 is the patent owner’s sole remedy for the unauthorized
practice of patented inventions for the government’s benefit, to the
388. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688, 706 (2003) (discussing
elements Zoltek would need to show to properly allege a taking). The Fifth
Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause provides that the government shall not take
private property without compensating its owners. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
389. 496 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
390. Id. at 591.
391. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350 (noting the COFC’s decision). Under the Tucker
Act a claimant may bring a claim for money damages against the United States if the
claim is “founded . . . upon the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
392. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352.
393. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
394. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352-53. A panel majority again rejected a vigorous
dissent, this time from Judge Newman, in denying Zoltek’s petition for rehearing.
See Zoltek v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
395. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353 (discussing the purpose of § 1498).
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exclusion of all others including constitutional theories of just
compensation.
VII. OTHER
In Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v. Secretary of
396
Veterans Affairs, the Federal Circuit struck down the TRICARE
Pharmacy Benefits Program (“TPBP”),397 because the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) did not follow the Administrative Procedures
Act (“APA”) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in
398
establishing the program.
399
The Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 (“VHCA”) was enacted to
reduce the cost of prescription drugs purchased by the VA and the
400
DOD.
The VHCA states that in order to receive federal Medicaid
funds for their products, pharmaceutical manufacturers are required
to enter into a Master Agreement and Pharmaceutical Pricing
Agreement whereby the manufacturers agree to offer their “covered
401
drugs” on the Federal Supply Schedule (“FSS”).
Moreover, under
the VHCA and the Master Agreement, when certain agencies,
including the VA and the DOD, purchase “covered drugs” off the FSS
contract or through a “depot contracting system,” they are to be
charged a price no higher than the calculated Federal Ceiling Price
(“FCP”), which is approximately seventy-six percent of the “non402
Federal average manufacturer price.”
The DOD provides health care benefits to “active duty service
members, retired service members, and their dependents” through a
403
system called TRICARE. As part of the TRICARE benefit, the DOD
404
reimburses retail pharmacies when its beneficiaries purchase drugs.
Prior to fall 2004, the DOD paid wholesaler prices without regard to
the FCP, because such reimbursements were not considered
396. 464 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
398. This program is known in the industry as the Tricare Retail Pharmacy Benefit
Plan (“TRRx”).
398. Id. at 1318-19.
399. 38 U.S.C. § 8126 (2000).
400. Coal. for Common Sense, 464 F.3d at 1310.
401. 38 U.S.C. § 8126(a).
402. Id. In the first year of the FSS contract, the Federal Ceiling Price is calculated
as seventy-six percent of Non-FAMP minus an additional CPI-U based discount. In
the second and subsequent years of the FSS contract, the FCP is calculated as the
lower of seventy-six percent of Non-FAMP minus an additional CPI-U based discount
and the FSS price on September 30 increased by the CPI-U percentage. 38 U.S.C.
§ 8126(c).
403. Coal. for Common Sense, 464 F.3d at 1309.
404. Id. 1309-10. TRICARE beneficiaries pay a co-payment for the drug and the
DOD pays the remainder of the cost. See id. (describing the payment system for the
TRICARE health care benefits program).
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purchases through FSS or a depot contracting system. The DOD
restructured the TPBP in 2004 with the intention of obtaining
refunds from the manufacturers on retail pharmacy sales based on
405
the difference between wholesaler pricing and FCP.
The TPBP
refund requirement was announced to manufacturers in an October
406
2004 “Dear Manufacturer letter” issued by the VA. In the letter, the
VA concluded that the TPBP program qualified as a “depot
contracting system” under the VHCA and that refunds would accrue
407
on TPBP sales starting October 1, 2004.
The plaintiff in this case, Coalition for Common Sense in
Government Procurement, is a trade association whose members
include pharmaceutical manufacturers that were required to pay
408
rebates pursuant to the October 2004 letter.
The Coalition’s
principal arguments were that the VA erred in concluding that TPBP
was a “depot contracting system” and that the VA’s Dear
Manufacturer letter was procedurally deficient because it was not
issued pursuant to the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking
409
procedures.
The court’s analysis focused principally on whether the VA’s letter
410
should be considered a substantive rule or an interpretive one.
This distinction was important because only substantive rules require
411
formal APA notice-and-comment procedures.
The government
argued that the letter merely interpreted the VHCA’s requirement to
412
But the court found
extend FCPs to depot contracting systems.
413
otherwise, and held that the letter established a substantive rule.
The court noted that the letter created a new refund system under
which manufacturers were “required to pay refunds . . . for covered
drugs purchased at network pharmacies”—something that previously
414
had not been required.
The court also emphasized that the
program would require manufacturers “to change sales data for

405. Id. at 1311-12.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1312.
408. Id. at 1308. Note that the VA agreed to stay enforcement of the refunds
pending the outcome of this case. Id. at 1312.
409. Id. at 1315.
410. Id. at 1316-18.
411. See id. at 1316 (“The determination of whether the letter is a substantive rule
or an interpretive rule will determine whether the agency was required to comply
with . . . the notice and comment procedures of section 553.”).
412. Id. at 1315.
413. Id. at 1319.
414. Id. at 1317-18.
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415

purposes of calculating non-FAMPs,” meaning that manufacturers
would be required to exclude the TPBP transactions from the NonFederal Average Manufacturer Price calculations as “Federal sales”
416
under the VHCA.
The court bolstered its holding that the letter
was a substantive rule by finding that the VA created the refund
system with the intention of binding itself as well as tribunals faced
417
with disputes under the program in the future.
Based on its determination that the letter is a substantive rule, the
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the letter under 38
418
U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
Since the VA had not complied with the
notice-and-comment procedures of section 553 of the APA before
issuing the letter in October 2004, the court set aside the letter as
419
“procedurally defective.”
The court then remanded the matter to the VA for compliance
with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, including 5 U.S.C.
420
§§ 552(a)(1) and 553. Having found for plaintiff on the procedural
issue, the court did not reach the question of whether the TPBP
constitutes a “depot contracting system” within the meaning of the
VHCA.
In the aftermath of the Federal Circuit’s decision in this case, the
421
DOD agreed to return all the rebates paid under the TPBP.
Moreover, the VA has issued guidance requiring the manufacturers
who paid refunds and excluded TPBP utilization from their NonFAMP calculations as “Federal sales” to recalculate their Non-FAMPs
for the affected time periods because TPBP transactions are no
422
longer considered “Federal sales” under the VHCA.
CONCLUSION
423

In 2006, Zoltek and Coalition for Common Sense in Government
424
Procurement were the two most noteworthy decisions due to their
415. Id. at 1318.
416. Id. (explaining the new refund system as stated under the Dear Manufacturer
letter).
417. Id.
418. Id.; 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
419. Coal. for Common Sense, 464 F.3d at 1318-19.
420. Id. at 1319.
421. See Letter from Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Senior Contract Attorney, Office of
General Counsel, Department of Veteran Affairs to Manufacturer of Covered Drugs
(Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://www1.va.gov/oamm/_bf/
oa/20061018ManfCvrDrugs.pdf.
422. See Letter from Department of Veteran Affairs to Refund-Paying
Manufacturers (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with author).
423. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
424. 464 F.3d 1306.

GOVERNMENT.OFFTOPRINTER

2007

2006 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT SUMMARY

4/7/2007 11:14:36 AM

1115

precedential and economic impacts. Zoltek dealt with the scope and
425
exclusivity of the section 1498 patent remedy, and Coalition for
Common Sense in Government Procurement invalidated the VA’s attempt
426
to impose federal ceiling prices on TRICARE retail pharmacy sales.
The Federal Circuit did not issue any particularly surprising or
innovative rulings on government contracts, although there were a
number of instances in which the court reached different conclusions
than the COFC or Boards of Contract Appeals. While the Federal
Circuit faces far fewer government contract cases than do the
tribunals whose decisions it reviews, it does not hesitate to assert its
independent judgment on questions of law in that realm, any more
than in fields such as patent law, that comprise a greater part of its
own docket.
This should encourage practitioners who are
unsuccessful in the first instance to consider appeal in cases not
clearly governed by Federal Circuit precedent.

425. See 442 F.3d 1347.
426. See 464 F.3d 1306.

